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PROPERTY
Many states will not have such an impressive history of
granting free speech rights broader than those provided by
the Federal Constitution. However, such a history is obviously
not necessary to the passage of a state statute protecting free
speech on private property, a course which might have sub-
stantial advantages over a judicially created right of access in
any case.20 2 Furthermore, even if a state's constitutional provi-
sion regarding free speech is worded identically to that in the
Federal Constitution, the state is still free to interpret it as
providing broader protection.20
A number of paths are open to the states to create a right
of access to privately owned property for free speech pur-
poses. The PruneYard case indicates that these paths are
largely free of federal constitutional obstacles, at least under
similar facts. The ultimate effect of the PruneYard decision
will depend on the extent to which individual states choose to
take advantage of this opportunity, and on how far their ef-
forts are allowed to proceed before the Supreme Court im-
poses further limitations.
CORDELIA S. MUNROE
PROPERTY-Caveat Emptor-Duty to Disclose Lim-
ited to Commercial Vendors. Ollerman v. O'Rourke
Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) and Kanack
v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426, 291 N.W.2d 864 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
Note, that by the civil law every man is bound to warrant
endum, and recall. (Cal. Const., art. 11, §§ 8, 9, and 13.)"
Because of this special importance of the right to petition, it has been carefully
guarded by the California courts. See generally Federalism, supra note 21, at 838-40.
202. Provision of a right of access via a legislative enactment would allow review
of data concerning, for instance, the prevalence of shopping centers in the state in
question. Such review, coupled with legislative hearings, would permit a better esti-
mate to be made of the need for special protection of free speech rights than is possi-
ble if the right of access is judicially created. Also, a statutory measure could deal
with such questions as control of the forum, the owner's rights, and so on, with a
detail not possible in judicial decisions.
203. See note 88 supra.
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the thing that he selleth or conveyeth, albeit there be no ex-
presse warranty; but the common law bindeth him not, un-
lesse there be a warranty, either in deed or in law; for caveat
emptor .... '
The more lengthy expression is caveat emptor, qui
ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit which means let a
purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of the amount and na-
ture of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper
caution.2 The rule of caveat emptor in realty transactions has
enjoyed a long, although increasingly tenuous, position in
Wisconsin and in this country generally.$ Its continued exis-
tence is in doubt because of the harsh and inequitable results
often reached through its application. The harshness of the
doctrine of caveat emptor is most striking when compared to
the continued development of consumer protection in the sale
of personal goods. One writer has observed that the law offers
greater protection to the purchaser of a seventy-nine cent dog
leash than to the purchaser of a $40,000 home.4 If the dog
leash is defective the purchaser can easily obtain a refund or a
new leash, or even sue to recover damages if the defective
leash resulted in the loss of his pet. The purchaser of the
home, on the other hand, is often without recourse when the
spring rains filter through his basement walls.
In two recent decisions,5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
discussed the concept of caveat emptor in the sale of realty.
The first of these decisions constituted a step toward abolition
of caveat emptor in the sale of realty, while the second found
caveat emptor alive and well in the setting of noncommercial
1. Sir Edward Coke as quoted in Note, Caveat Emptor in the Sale of Real Prop-
erty - Epitaph to an Inequitable Maxim, 4 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 54 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Caveat Emptor].
2. H. BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 769 (7th ed. 1874).
3. In Wisconsin, Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980)
marks the end of caveat emptor with respect to dealings between a noncommercial
purchaser and a commercial vendor. See also Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453,
112 P.2d 661 (1941); Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960); Kaze v.
Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1955); Weikel v. Sterns, 142 Ky. 513, 135 S.W. 980
(1911) discussed infra, for examples of substantial inroads into the doctrine of caveat
emptor.
4. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Prop-
erty, 53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1964-65) [hereinafter cited as Haskell].
5. Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) and Kanack v.
Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426, 291 N.W.2d 864 (1980).
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realty vendors. The purpose of this article is to analyze the
factual context and holding of these two decisions, to evaluate
the reasoning employed in them, particularly the distinction
made between commercial and noncommercial vendors, and,
finally, to examine their likely effect on realty transactions in
Wisconsin.
II. RECENT WISCONSIN DECISIONS
A. Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co.
In the first of these decisions, Olterman v. O'Rourke Co.'
the court was presented with a purchaser of a lot for residen-
tial construction who alleged that the commercial-subdivider-
vendor had fraudulently failed to disclose the existence of a
well beneath the surface of the lot. The nondisclosure led the
purchaser to believe that the lot was suitable for the immedi-
ate construction of his home. Shortly after the excavation be-
gan, the well was uncapped, releasing water which resulted in
large expenditures for cleanup and changes in construction
plans by the purchaser. The purchaser brought suit against
the vendor on the theory of intentional misrepresentation
and, in the alternative, negligent misrepresentation for failure
to exercise ordinary care in disclosing the defective condition
of the lot.
The case reached the supreme court on an appeal from an
order overruling the vendor's motion to dismiss the pur-
chaser's amended complaint for failing to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Justice Connor Hansen's con-
curring opinion7 was entirely correct in pointing out that the
sole issue on such an appeal is whether or not the pleadings
set forth any facts upon which relief could be granted. The
majority, however, after having determined that the com-
plaint stated a claim for intentional misrepresentation, went
beyond that threshold issue and briefly discussed the merits
of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Regard-
less of the propriety of the court's discussion of negligent mis-
representation in this particular case, its holding, with respect
to intentional misrepresentation through nondisclosure in re-
alty sales, was progressive but narrow. The court held that:
6. 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).
7. Id. at 54, 288 N.W.2d at 113.
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[A] subdivider-vendor of a residential lot has a duty to a
"non-commercial" purchaser to disclose facts which are
known to the vendor, which are material to the transaction,
and which are not readily discernible to the purchaser. A
fact is known to the vendor if the vendor has actual knowl-
edge of the fact or if the vendor acted in reckless disregard
as to the existence of the fact.
A fact is material if a reasonable purchaser would attach
importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining
the choice of action in the transaction in question; or if the
vendor knows or has reason to know that the purchaser re-
gards or is likely to regard the matter as important in deter-
mining the choice of action, although a reasonable purchaser
would not so regard it. See 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts,
sec. 538 (1977). Whether the fact is or is not readily discern-
ible will depend on the nature of the fact, the relation of the
vendor and purchaser and the nature of the transaction.8
In sum, the court held that a commercial realty seller has a
duty to disclose to a noncommercial purchaser any material
fact which the vendor knows or should know about the realty.
A material fact is defined as one that a reasonable purchaser
would regard as important to the transaction and any other
fact the vendor knows or has reason to know is important to
this particular purchaser.
While recognizing that the traditional rule in Wisconsin
had been that there was no duty to disclose information to a
buyer of real estate in arm's length transactions,9 the court
noted that times had changed" and that the "rugged individ-
ualism" of the 19th century has been displaced by a need for
formulating business judgments without being misled by
others. With that liberal preamble and the general progres-
siveness of the authorities cited throughout the opinion, it
seemed likely that the court's narrow holding protecting non-
commercial purchasers from commercial vendors only, was the
cautious beginning of a complete abolition of the rule of ca-
veat emptor in sales of realty. Such notions were quickly dis-
8. Id. at 42, 288 N.W.2d at 107.
9. Id. at 29, 288 N.W.2d at 101.
10. Id.
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dispelled, however, with the court's decision in Kanack v.
Kremski.n
B. Kanack v. Kremski
The Kanack case was brought before the court on an ap-
peal from an order which granted the defendant-seller's mo-
tion for summary judgment. In that case the purchasers in-
spected the home for sale and bought it from the owner-
occupants. Some time subsequent to the purchase and closing
of the transaction, the purchasers discovered what was alleged
to be a "serious water leakage problem" which the seller had
failed to disclose. As in Ollerman, the purchasers brought suit
against the sellers on the basis of intentional misrepresenta-
tion for failure to disclose a material latent defect in the re-
alty. The court affirmed the lower court's order granting sum-
mary judgment and in so doing noted that in Ollerman, "this
court specifically referred to the holding as 'narrow' and lim-
ited it to a 'subdivider-vendor of a residential lot.' "12
Justice Abrahamson delivered a concurring opinion 3 in an
effort to more fully explain the majority's rationale for af-
firming the summary judgment and dismissing the amended
complaint on the merits. The justice cited Wilson v. Conti-
nental Insurance Co."4 for the proposition that when certain
public policy questions are involved, the complaint must set
forth the facts in detail in order to withstand a motion to dis-
miss. Justice Abrahamson reasoned that the majority had ob-
viously decided that the complaints failed to state a claim
and, due to the lapse of time since the action was commenced
and the number of pleadings already submitted, the ends of
justice would not be served by granting the plaintiffs leave to
amend the complaint. While Justice Abrahamson agreed that
the complaint in this case did not state a cause of action, she
did state that "[t]he majority opinion recognizes that there
may be instances where non-disclosure of a defect by a non-
commercial seller engaged in a real estate transaction may
constitute intentional misrepresentation." 15 This statement is
contradicted by the majority's emphasis on the special knowl-
11. 96 Wis. 2d 426, 291 N.W.2d 864 (1980).
12. Id. at 433, 291 N.W.2d at 867.
13. Id. at 435, 291 N.W.2d at 868 (Abraharnson, J., concurring).
14. 87 Wis. 2d 310, 274 N.W.2d 679 (1979).
15. 96 Wis.2d at 436, 291 N.W.2d at 868 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
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edge of commercial vendors"6 and the majority's statement
that "the parties appear to be noncommercial persons en-
gaged in a typical real estate transaction. Under these circum-
stances, the sellers were under no duty to disclose . . .
Before discussing how these two decisions may affect Wiscon-
sin law, a brief discussion of the changing law of misrepresen-
tation and realty sales may be helpful.
III. REALTY LAW: WHERE IT'S BEEN-WHERE IT'S GOING
A. Caveat Emptor-Doctrine From an Earlier Day
It is generally agreed that the maxim of caveat emptor was
fashioned in and for an earlier day-a day when trade was
simple and face-to-face between neighbors. The rule devel-
oped in a time when goods and land were there to be seen and
everybody knew everybody else's land. One writer observed
that during that time caveat emptor was more than a rule of
nonliability; rather, it was a philosophy that placed a pre-
mium on individual skill and minimal public imposition on
standards of fair play.18 Peek v. Gurney,"" an English case,
was one of the earlier decisions to set forth the rule that there
is no duty to disclose facts however morally censurable their
nondisclosure. One of the basic questions facing the courts to-
day, in the field of real property conveyancing, is whether this
rule, conceived in and for another era, should be replaced by
the creation of implied warranties against latent defects or by
a broad duty to disclose material defects. 20 Despite many au-
thors'21 questions of the propriety of continued application of
caveat emptor, it is still the touchstone in most jurisdictions
today. There have been inroads made on the doctrine in Wis-
16. Id. at 433, 291 N.W.2d at 867.
17. Id. at 434-35, 291 N.W.2d at 868.
18. See Dunham, Vendor's Obligations as to Fitness of Land for a Particular
Purpose, 37 MmN. L. RE V. 108 (1952-53) [hereinafter cited as Dunham].
19. L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
20. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 W.
Ras. L. REv. 5, 9 (1956-57) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarb].
21. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the
Rule, 14 VAND. L. Rlv. 541 (1960-61) [hereinafter cited as Bearman]; Dunham, supra
note 18; Haskell, note 4 supra; Note, Caveat Emptor, supra note 1; Note, The Doc-
trine of Caveat Emptor as Applied to Both the Leasing and Sale of Real Property;
The Need for Reappraisal and Reform, 1-2 RuTGERs-CAm. L.J. 120 (1969-70).
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consin as evidenced by cases like Pines v. Perssion,22 cited in
the Ollerman opinion, and Ollerman and Kanack themselves.
More often than not, however, the exceptions or inroads made
on the doctrine of caveat emptor are the result of some pecu-
liar fact pattern which leaves the general rule intact.23
B. Caveat Emptor-Attacked Through Misrepresentation
Prominent among the avenues through which caveat
emptor has been attacked are the three forms of misrepresen-
tation defined by the court in Ollerman and first dealt with in
Whipp v. Iverson.24 The Whipp court noted that the three
bases for responsibility for representations-intentional, neg-
ligence and strict responsibility-are alike in that each re-
quires (1) a representation of a fact; (2) the representation of
fact must be untrue; and (3) the plaintiff must believe the
representation and rely upon it to his damage.2 5 Also noted
were the respects in which the three classes of responsibility
for representations differed. In addition to the elements men-
tioned, a cause of action for intentional deceit requires evi-
dence that the defendant knew his representation was false, or
that he made it without knowing its truth, with intent to
deceive and induce the plaintiff to act upon it to his damage.
In negligence, the plaintiff need only show that the defendant
failed to exercise ordinary care in making a misrepresentation
and that the defendant had a legally enforceable duty to exer-
cise care in making the particular statement. Finally, in strict
responsibility, in addition to the first three factors, the mis-
representation must be made on the defendant's personal
knowledge or under circumstances in which he ought to have
known the truth or untruth of the statement and the defen-
dant must have an economic interest in the transactions.28
Having outlined the elements of a cause of action in mis-
22. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 594-95, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961). The court held that a
residential lease contains an implied warranty of habitability.
23. Goldfarb, supra note 20, at 17.
24. 43 Wis. 2d 166, 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
25. Id. at 169, 168 N.W.2d at 203.
26. Id. at 169-70, 168 N.W.2d at 203-04. See Harper and McNeely, A Synthesis of
the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REv. 939, 988 n.12 (1938); Also on negli-
gent misrepresentation see Note, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation in Mary-
land, 35 MD. L. REv. 651, 661-62 (1976); 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526,
552 & 552C (1977).
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representation, it is important to note that many of the cases
where caveat emptor has been called into question, including
Ollerman and Kanack, were cases of nondisclosure and, there-
fore, as a practical matter, there has been no representation,
much less a misrepresentation. Nevertheless, most courts have
recognized, as the Wisconsin court did,2 7 that where there is a
duty to disclose a fact, failure to do so is treated in the law as
the equivalent of a representation that the fact does not ex-
ist.2" As in the law of positive misrepresentations of fact, ca-
veat emptor has governed the majority of decisions rendered
concerning the duty to disclose latent material defects in re-
alty. That is not to say there has been no change. In nondis-
closure cases, like other areas where caveat emptor is applied,
there have been many exceptions carved out of the general
rule of no duty to disclose.
As early as 1926 the Connecticut Supreme Court29 held
that the surrounding circumstances of a vendor's silence may
operate to produce a false impression in the mind of the ven-
dee and thereby lead the vendee to believe that a certain fact
exists and amount to an affirmation of it. Other exceptions to
the no duty to disclose rule can be found where vendor and
vendee stand in some type of trust relationship,30 or where the
seller actively conceals the defect or tells half-truths, or where
there are facts peculiarly within the seller's knowledge.s
For a graphic example of the situations that prompt courts
to create these exceptions to avoid application of caveat
emptor, consider the case of Swinnton v. Whitinsville Savings
Banks2 cited in many texts and law reviews.33 The case in-
volved the sale of a house, which was infested with termites,
by the defendant-vendor to the unsuspecting plaintiff-vendee.
The court placed much emphasis on the fact that the parties
27. 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).
28. Id. at 26, 288 N.W.2d at 99-100.
29. Gayne v. Smith, 104 Conn. 650, 652, 134 A. 62, 63 (1926).
30. Goldfarb, supra note 20, at 17.
31. W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 696-97 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Prosser]; Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L.
REv. 1, 2 n.1 (1936).
32. 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942).
33. Goldfarb, supra note 20, at 14; Prosser, supra note 31, at 696; Haskell, supra
note 4, at 643; Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEx. L. Rxv. 1, 4
(1953-54).
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were not in any fiduciary relationship or any other recognized
exception to the general rule of nondisclosure, and, therefore,
held that caveat emptor applied. Dean Prosser has com-
mented that this case means that "the owner of a dwelling
which he knows to be riddled with termites can unload it with
impunity upon a buyer unaware, and go on his way rejoicing.
These are surely singularly unappetizing cases."
C. The Trend Toward Consumer Protection
Blind application of the maxim caveat emptor once charac-
terized the law. However, an increasing tendency by the court
to find exceptions to the rule has prompted the expression
that caveat emptor in the sale of realty is dying but not dead.
It is no coincidence that the increasing willingness by the
courts to find exceptions to the rule has paralleled the devel-
opment of consumer protection in the field of personal prop-
erty sales law. Prosser notes that the law of real property has
progressed more slowly than in other fields but there have
been notable stirrings even there. 5 Courts and commenta-
tors 6 are in substantial agreement that in areas of the sale of
new homes,' 7 homes built on filled land, 8 and in landlord-ten-
ant laws9 the trend is undoubtedly toward greater protection
of the unwary, unsuspecting buyer-lessee. The legislatures
have also been concerned with protection of the buyer'" and
have enacted the Securities Act,'1 Truth in Lending Act' 2 the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosures Act'" and the Truth in
Negotiation Act" as the fruits of their concern.
34. Prosser, supra note 31.
35. Id.
36. Haskell, supra note 4, at 645-47; Keeton, supra note 33, at 1; Note, Caveat
Emptor, supra note 1, at 60; Bearman, supra note 21, at 570-72.
37. See Comment, Liability of the Builder Vendor Under the Implied Warranty
of Habitability-Where Does It End?, 13 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 593 (1979).
38. See Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941) and Cohen v.
Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960).
39. See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
40. J. CALAMARI & J. PRILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-20 at 288 (2d ed. 1977).
41. 15 U.S.C. 88 77a-77bbbb (1976).
42. 15 U.S.C. §8 1601-1691f (1976).
43. 15 U.S.C. §8 1701-1720 (1976).
44. 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976), discussed in 1-2 PuB. CONTRACT L.J. 88 (1963) relat-
ing to armed forces procurement contracts.
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D. Summary of the State of Realty Law
In summary, the rule of caveat emptor in realty transac-
tions developed in a much simpler day when the land was
often bought and sold between neighbors. With increasing
mobility and sophistication our society has reached the stage
where its laws must protect the unwary buyer from the un-
scrupulous seller. More and more frustrated buyers and les-
sees are turning to the theory of misrepresentation to attack
continued application of caveat emptor. The courts and legis-
latures have responded to the importance of protecting the
consumer through greater flexibility in the application of the
law of misrepresentations, adoption of implied warranties, and
expanded duties of disclosure. It is against this background
that the Ollerman and Kanack decisions were written. As a
result of these decisions a duty of disclosure is placed on com-
mercial vendors, but no such duty is applicable to noncom-
mercial vendors in the sale of realty. From this juncture one
can consider the propriety or impropriety of the court's hold-
ing in these two cases. Why, for instance, was the duty to dis-
close latent material defects thrust upon the commercial ven-
dor only? Is the court's policy which distinguishes between
commercial and noncommercial vendors a well-reasoned one?
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE WISCONSIN DECISIONS
A. The Court's Limited Development of a Duty of
Disclosure
When a court resolves a question of legal duty it is making
a policy determination.45 Prosser has observed that "[t]here is
a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Con-
stitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which
we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it
necessarily begs the essential question."46 The question is,
why did the Wisconsin court not impose a duty to disclose
latent material defects in sales of realty by noncommercial
vendors? The court cites with approval the way the Second
Restatement of Torts handles the duty to disclose.47 In partic-
45. Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 211-12, 112 N.W.2d 705, 708 (1961).
46. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953).
47. 94 Wis. 2d 17, 36, 288 N.W.2d 95, 104 (1980).
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ular, the court notes comment 1 of section 55148 which states
that:
The continuing development of modern business ethics
has, however, limited to some extent this privilege to take
advantage of ignorance. There are situations in which the
defendant not only knows that his bargaining adversary is
acting under a mistake basic to the transaction but also
knows that the adversary, by reason of the relation between
them, the customs of the trade or other objective circum-
stances, is reasonably relying upon a disclosure of the unre-
vealed fact if it exists. In this type of case good faith and
fair dealing may require a disclosure.
The court also observed that draftsmen of the Restate-
ment had recognized the gradual expansion of the duty to dis-
close and did not intend to impede that development by their
treatment of it. One cannot help but question why the court's
holdings in Ollerman and Kanack were so narrow when
neither the Restatement sections, nor the commentators cited
by the court in Ollerman, nor even the case law cited by the
court as evidence of the trend toward legally requiring disclo-
sure in realty sales, made any distinction between commercial
and noncommercial vendors.
In Weikel v. Sterns,49 one of the cases cited by the 01-
lerman court, the Kentucky court found a duty on the part of
the noncommercial vendor to disclose to the vendees that the
house for sale had been constructed on top of a sewage pit.
The pit had been covered with clay and was still collecting
sewage from the vendor's building next door creating an odor
in the house which made it virtually untenantable. The Ken-
tucky court made no distinctions between commercial and
noncommercial vendors or vendees. The court held that "[t]o
sell such a house without disclosing the situation, when the
purchaser would have no means of knowing the facts from the
pit being covered up as it was, was to practice a fraud upon
hbim." 5 0
Another case cited by the court evidencing the trend to-
48. Id. at 37, 288 N.W.2d at 105.
49. 142 Ky. 513, 134 S.W. 908 (1911).
50. Id. at -, 134 S.W. at 909.
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ward requiring disclosure is Kaze v. Compton.51 This was a
Kentucky case in which the court held that the existence of a
twelve inch drain tile running beneath the house and causing
water to accumulate there was a condition substantial or vital
enough to place a duty upon the vendors to disclose it. This
case, like Weikel, involved only noncommercial parties. Nev-
ertheless, the duty to disclose a material defect was found.
A California court has held that when a vendor sells real
property which he knows has been filled, and the value of
which is materially affected by such filling, he is bound to dis-
close these facts to the vendee.52 Upon failure to disclose the
defects and discovery of the same by the vendee, the contract
may be rescinded at the vendee's option. A similar policy has
been adopted in Colorado."
Though these cases certainly are evidence of the trend to-
ward imposing a duty of disclosure, they, like the other au-
thorities cited by the Ollerman court, failed to mention any
distinction between commercial and noncommercial vendors.
Could it be that the distinction the Wisconsin court makes is
based on the court's desire to retain the rule of caveat
emptor?
B. Caveat Emptor-Evaluation of a Policy
Among the most oft cited reasons for continued applica-
tions of caveat emptor is that uncertainty would pervade the
entire real estate field if the rule were abolished. The fear is
expressed that real estate transactions would become chaotic
if vendors were subjected to liability long after they had
parted company with the property.54 Naturally, a major
change in the law, like the abolition of caveat emptor, would
create some confusion and uncertainty at first but the sale of
personal property and manufactured items is no longer gov-
erned by caveat emptor and that field has not been plagued
by chaos as a result.55
Another justification offered on behalf of caveat emptor is
51. 283 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1955).
52. Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941).
53. Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960).
54. These fears are expressed in Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293,
297-98, 134 A.2d 717, 719 (App. Div. 1957).
55. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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that the parties in realty transactions can inspect the property
for themselves to determine its suitability.5" This reasoning,
however, ignores the fact that the defects that have brought
about the cry for warranties and disclosure are latent defects
which are, by definition, defects that are beyond the reach of
a diligent inspection by the ordinary vendee. Inspection is
simply an inadequate substitute for full and frank disclosure.
Still another reason to maintain the doctrine is that the
lessee or vendee has the option of obtaining express warran-
ties if he desires further protection.57 Asking for warranties,
however, is often times beyond the sophistication of the aver-
age lessee or vendee. And in many places the housing market
is a seller's market and the prudent seller may just as easily
refuse one offer to accept another simply on the basis that he
is not asked to make any promises in the second.
A fourth argument in favor of caveat emptor has been that
most landlords and vendors will take it upon themselves to
repair defects in the property, that were latent at the time of
the transaction, out of a sense of pride and the need to main-
tain goodwill with customers.5 8 The volume of litigation that
has arisen in this area is ample evidence that pride and good-
will are less than adequate protection for vendee.
One of the most common arguments against expansion of
any legal duty is that a rash of litigation will ensue."9 The ob-
vious response to this assertion is that the court's function is
to solve disputes as long as the claims are just. Certainly there
would be less litigation if the court were to abolish liability for
striking another against his will, but no one would advocate
such a thing. There are values of greater importance than lim-
iting litigation.
Perhaps the strongest factor which supports the existence
of caveat emptor is the apparent difficulty of administering
the alternatives. The most frequently suggested alternatives
are the imposition of implied warranties and/or an expanded
duty of disclosure. For instance, one observer has noted the
difficulty in defining the limits of any warranty for land or
56. Note, Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation in Sales of Residential
Dwellings, 43 DEN. L.J. 379 (1966).
57. Haskell, supra note 4, at 642.
58. Bearman, supra note 36, at 573.
59, Id.
1981]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
housing due to the many and varied purposes to which land is
put and the vastly different standards of living conditions to
which people are accustomed. 0 Although several writers have
argued persuasively for the adoption of implied warranties in
realty transactions,"1 a less radical and more tenable position
for the near future is to urge the other alternative to caveat
emptor-a duty of disclosure. Rather than impose a blanket
warranty on realty sales, the law could encourage vendors and
lessors to simply tell the prospective buyers and lessees up
front any material or basic problem with the property. Of
course, a substantial amount of litigation would revolve
around what was or was not material and a standard may
prove difficult to establish. As early as 1936 Dean Keeton had
suggested the use of the "reasonable" or "standard" man to
determine the existence of a duty to disclose. 2 Admittedly,
such a standard is difficult to define and apply, but it has ex-
isted as a standard for determining the existence of a duty in
negligence actions for many years. The application of the rea-
sonable man in this new context should be at least as
practical.
In sum, many of the reasons traditionally advanced for the
continued application of caveat emptor are not very persua-
sive. Additionally, there is good reason to believe that the al-
ternatives to caveat emptor are viable and not as difficult to
apply as might be expected. Again, the question is, why did
the Ollerman court retain caveat emptor for noncommercial
vendors?
C. Commercial/Noncommercial Vendor Distinction Not
Persuasive: A Call for Honesty in the Market Place
Each of the justifications for caveat emptor presented in
the last section were urged by the defendant-vendor in 01-
lerman's The court found that the seller's arguments were
"not persuasive in light of the facts alleged in complaint and
60. Dunham, supra note 18, at 119. For a discusson of other questions to be an-
swered in the application of warranties see Comment, Liability of the Builder-Ven-
dor Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability- Where does It End? 13 CREIGH-
TON L. RFv. 593 (1979).
61. Haskell, supra note 4; Dunham, supra note 18.
62. Keeton, supra note 31, at 5 n.13.
63. 94 Wis. 2d at 40-41, 288 N.W.2d at 106-07.
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our narrow holding in this case. '64 The court went on to
explain:
Where the vendor is in the real estate business and is
skilled and knowledgeable and the purchaser is not, the pur-
chaser is in a poor position to discover a condition which is
not readily discernible, and the purchaser may justifiably
rely on the knowledge and skill of the vendor. Thus, in this
instant case a strong argument for imposing a duty on the
seller to disclose material facts is this "reliance factor." The
buyer portrayed in this complaint had a reasonable expecta-
tion of honesty in the market place, that is, that the vendor
would disclose material facts which it knew and which were
not readily discernible. Under these circumstances the law
should impose a duty of honesty on the seller.6 5
At first glance the court's distinction between commercial
and noncommercial vendors appears to be entirely reasonable.
It does not seem unreasonable to require a higher standard of
care from a vendor who is in the real estate business and is
"skilled and knowledgeable" in such affairs. Upon deeper re-
flection however, the court's holding seems quite arbitrary.
The implication to be derived from the holding in 01-
lerman and Kanack is that somehow the purchaser is in a
poorer position to discover a latent defect when he is dealing
with a skilled commercial vendor than when he is dealing with
a noncommercial vendor. Such a proposition is specious since
a latent defect is equally latent whether the realty for sale is
held by a commercial or noncommercial vendor. Nor can the
different treatment be based on the differing sophistication of
the two types of vendors because it requires no sophistication
to tell the truth. Adhering to the new duty to disclose mate-
rial facts does not require a skilled and knowledgeable
seller-just an honest one. Imposing the duty to disclose on
all vendors would not prevent the shrewd business person,
with an eye for market fluctuations and good buys, from mak-
ing a profit. It is the chiseler, the vendor who sells "lemons"
in the real estate market that such a rule would censure.
Whether a particular vendor is a corporation or an individ-
ual, the result of buying realty laden with hidden defects is
64. Id. at 41, 288 N.W.2d at 107.
65. Id. at 41-42, 288 N.W.2d at 107.
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equally burdensome on the vendee. Imagine the frustration of
a first time home purchaser who finds that, though he and his
neighbor purchased materially defective homes at the same
time, his neighbor had the good fortune of having purchased
his home through a commercial vendor and, thus, was af-
forded a remedy under Wisconsin law. He, on the other hand,
could only hope that some other unsuspecting soul would
some day buy from him, or go remedyless. If, by chance, he
was lucky enough to unload the house the cycle could con-
tinue, all in the name of freedom of contract and stability in
the market place.
In contrast to this sad scenario, consider the stability in
the market that could be achieved if every vendee was confi-
dent that each vendor was bound by the law to disclose those
latent defects in the realty for sale or rent that a reasonable
man would consider material. Suppose the two of them, ven-
dor and vendee, could amicably agree that the vendor would
fix certain of the defects or that a reasonable abatement in
the asking price be made. There may even be some very ad-
vantageous side effects from such a rule. The quality of hous-
ing in general may improve due to the inability to sell a house
without disclosing its material defects. Landlords would have
another source of incentive to maintain their buildings.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Wisconsin court has taken a step in the right direction
with its Ollerman decision. With the continued expansion of
the use of warranties and other forms of consumer protection
in the field of personal property, it is quite likely that the
court will eventually expand its narrow holding to include a
duty to disclose latent material defects in realty to all ven-
dors. The Wisconsin court might benefit from some advice
given by the New Jersey court:
The law should be based on current concepts of what is
right and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-
ending need for keeping its common law principles abreast
of the times. Ancient distinctions which make no sense in
today's society and tend to discredit the law should be read-
ily rejected."6
66. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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It is right and just to disclose to vendees those hidden de-
fects which materially lessen the value of the realty they are
purchasing or renting. The WisconSin court is apparently
aware of the outmoded aid no longer useful application of the
maxim caveat emptor and has begun the process of eliminat-
ing it. It is hoped that the court will recognize the inequity of
imposing the duty of disclosure on a certain class of vendors
while retaining the rule of caveat emptor for others and will
make the duty of disclosure espoused in Ollerman applicable
to all vendors. Until then, caveat emptor in Wisconsin realty
transactions is dying but not dead.
FREDERICK C. WAMHOFF
PROPERTY-Landlord-Tenant-Landlord No
Longer Immune from Tort Liability for Failure to
Exercise Reasonable Care in Maintaining Premises.
Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 91 Wis.
2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979). At common law, the lease
of land was treated as equivalent to a sale of land for the term
of the lease. The lessee acquired an estate in land and was, for
the time he occupied the land, subject to virtually all the lia-
bilities of the owner of a fee simple.' For this reason, the doc-
trine of caveat emptor applied to a lessee as well as to a ven-
dee. The lessee, like a vendee, was required to inspect the
land for himself and take it as he found it. The general rule
was that there was no tort liability on the part of the landlord
to the lessee or to others entering on the land for injuries re-
sulting from conditions on the premises.,
In the recent decision of Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance
Co. of America,3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court changed the
scope of a landlord's duty toward his tenants (whether under
a lease or not) and their visitors for injuries resulting from
1. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 62 (1809); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876).
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 63 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser]; 1 H. TiFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, § 104 (3d ed. B. Jones
1939). For a thorough discussion of the historical development of the common law
rules of landlord-tenant relationships, see generally Love, Landlord's Liability for
Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability? 1975 Wis. L. REV.
19 [hereinafter cited as Love].
3. 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979).
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